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ABSTRACT
Can Increased Intermediation Impede Growth?
The regulation of intertemporal consumption decisions
may be more critical a function of a growth promoting
financial sector than the efficient allocation of savings
between investment projects usually cited. Using standard
analytics the paper begins establishing the possible
incompatibility of pareto optimality and growth. It then
demonstrates using a two period dynamic model in a Nash
framework that in an economy where agents earn their incomes
from differing endowments of labor and capital, increases in
investment by "capitalists" will be partially offset by an
increased desire for consumption by wage earners. It
follows that development policies designed to increase
capital accumulation will be frustrated by this offset, and
that a sudden liberalization of consumption borrowing may
result in dramatic falls in savings rates. A theoretical
rationale is thus provided for both the restrictions on
consumer credit visible in many Asian NICs as well as the
consumption boom observed during the 1970' s Chilean
liberalization experiment.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper we argue that the critical function of a growth
promoting financial structure may be the regulation of intertemporal
consumption decisions, rather than the efficient allocation of savings
between investment projects usually emphasized by Fry (1980,1982),
Galbis (1977), McKinnon (1973,1976) and others. In particular we
demonstrate the existence of a savings reducing externality arising from
the accumulation process itself that is likely to impede growth in the
absence of institutional constraints on consumer borrowing.
Our results build on the often overlooked but theoretically almost
self-evident result that growth and pareto optimality can be
incompatible goals and that the market rate of interest can retard as
often as promote capital accumulation. 1 Using relatively simple
analytics, we begin showing that "intertemporal trade" arising from
increased intermediation can be growth reducing under many non-
pathological assumptions about technology, endowments and agents
preferences.
We then demonstrate, using a simple dynamic two period, two agent
model in a Nash framework, that the normal process of capital
accumulation must generate such a growth reducing outcome through an
increased tendency to consume against future income by certain classes
of agents irrespective of their subjective rates of discount. In an
economy where otherwise identical agents, earn their income from
differing endowments of labor and capital, increases in investment by
We sidestep the question of the optimal rate of growth given the inability of absent future agents to participate
in current credit markets. See Sen(1984), Deaton(1988). Blanchard(1989) argues that even in a context of
overlapping generations models, the market equilibrium will still not be the same as a planner maximieing utility
of all agents across time.
"capitalists" will be partially offset by an increased desire for
consumption by wage earners due to both a rise in the marginal product
of their labor and a fall in returns to capital. Not only is it then
straightforward to show that development policies designed to increase
capital accumulation will be frustrated by this offset, but that sudden
liberalization of consumption or mortgage borrowing may result in
dramatic falls in savings rates.
Treatment of the subject of non- investment related borrowing in
the financial development literature has been undeservedly sparse
considering the provocative range of country experiences over the last
twenty years. Chile's 1976-82 unsucessful experiment with completely
unregulated capital markets saw real rates of interest far above
feasible returns to productive capital, partially due to a boom in
consumer demand for credit. 2 Japan and Korea provide disquieting
counter examples with their combination of repressed and dualistic
financial sectors and stellar growth rates. 3 In these countries,
investment borrowing was provided a safe subsidized haven with a steady
source of savings while non- investment spending, including consumption,
was delegated to informal sector markets at much higher rates. 4 These
institutional features preventing the consumption crowding out effect we
derive, rather than frequently invoked cultural characteristics, may be
critical to understanding savings rates in these countries.
2 Schmitt-Hebel(1987), Corbo(1985)
3 Feldman (1985), Sueuki (1986), Cargill and Royama (1988) Greenwood (1988), Cole and Park (1978)
The suggestion by the Japanese representative at the recent April 1990 bilateral trade talks that the U.S. restrict
consumers to two credit cards confirms that they view regulation of consumer borrowing an important policy
instrument even for developed countries.
II. FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION
The literature frequently assumes a unitary representative agent,
the archetypal capitalist, or multiple agents with homogenous
preferences who allocate an initial endowment across time subject to
expected returns to investment. However, only with differentiation of
actors either in endowments, technology or preferences are there gains
from financial intermediation. Drawing on relatively simple analytics,
it is straightforward to show the efficiency gains on which McKinnon
based his advocacy of increased intermediation as critical to economic
development defined as "reducing the great dispersion in social rates of
return to investment" visible in most LDC's. 5 Graph 1 shows how both the
efficiency of capital and the welfare of two identical agents facing
different technologies or endowments can be enhanced by intertemporal
"trade." It is also clear that this pareto improvement does not
necessarily imply higher levels of growth. Depending on the preferences
of our identical individuals and the particular technologies, the losses
in second period consumption, C2 may exceed gains
m
A case more relevant to our argument is that of a thrifty agent
with strong preference for second period consumption and a greedy agent
favoring consumption this period facing identical technologies. Again,
as graph 2 shows, intermediation allows both agents now reach a higher
level of utility but the quantity of second period consumption, C2 may
fall. This effect becomes more dramatic with the introduction of a
second period endowment or more generally, an alternative source of
income to capital rents
. As graph 3 shows , our greedy agent can now
dissave. In arguing for greater intermediation, we generally envision
5 P. 9McKinnon(1973).
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only the isolated entrepreneur now able to realize investment plans
because of increased access to credit. Just as easily, however, we may
find consumers with rates of subjective time preferences exceeding any
feasible return to capital now competing for investible resources who
previously would have been forced to live within their means each
period. 6 Increased financial intermediation in this context may lead to
a pareto superior outcome, but may not deliver the higher growth rates
promised.
The model presented in the next section shows how in the normal
process of capital accumulation a class of greedier actors with second
period "endowments" naturally arises. Within a general equilibrium
framework we add to our archetypal capitalist a second actor with
identical preferences who derives her second period income not only from
capital rents on first period consumption deferred, but also from
returns to her labor, effectively a second period endowment. Her
optimal, rational behavior will tend to offset increases in investment
by capitalists because of a resulting double disincentive to savings: a
fall in the marginal return to first period consumption deferred and an
expected rise in future income from wages . We may find casual support
for such "consumption crowding out" in the observed inverse relation in
the U.S. between corporate and personal savings known as "Denison's Law"
of relatively constant private savings as a fraction of GNP (Denison
1958). 7 We show the offset can be complete under certain assumptions
Thayler and Shefrin(1981) cite estimates of subjective rates of discount between 25-122%, far above a relevant
rate of interest. They argue that self-imposed or institutionally imposed borrowing constraints such as Christmas
clubs or bonus pay schemes in Japan serve to keep savings rates higher than would be expected given estimated
SRD's.
•7
David and Scadding(1974) extend Denison's work and find the same relation across from 1868-1968. Further
they find that over the same period that there has been a shift away from personal savings toward corporate
savings within gross savings.
and is positively related to labor's share in GNP making it a
particularly relevent effect in developing economies. We further argue
that in situations where consumer access to markets has historically
been denied, an accumulated repressed demand for consumption credit may
suddenly compete with investors upon liberalization of financial markets
that may lead to a substantial fall in savings and net investment that
dwarfs expected efficiency gains.
III. A DYNAMIC TWO AGENT MODEL
A. The General Case
Our economy is populated by two representative agents who live for
two periods and differ only in initial endowments of capital and labor.
They either consume or invest the single good in period one and consume
everything in the second period. The agents exhibit identical utility
and perfect forsight, but derive their income in different proportions
from capital and from wages. The agents' decisions to accumulate
capital or consume are interdependent since both depend on the marginal
product of the total stock of capital which includes investment of both
labor and capital. Following Sargent (1987) we derive the Nash
equilibrium for this two player dynamic or differential game with no
randomness
.
We assume an aggregate well behaved production function exhibiting
constant returns to scale in its two inputs, capital (K) and labor (L)
1) Q - F(K,L): f(0) - 0, f(oo) - oo, f> 0, f ' (oo) -
Labor (L) supplies L units of labor in period 1 and period 2 and begins
with no capital but can accumulate during period 1 by consuming less
than it earns. The Capitalists (K) possess no labor, Ko units of capital
and may accumulate in the same manner Kik. Both are also subject to the
constraints
:
i. (Ko.L) - Cik- Kik + C 1L - Kil
Total first period output goes either into first period consumption by
labor or capitalists (Cik.C^l) or investment (output carried over to
period 2) by labor or capitalist (Kik, Kil) • And
ii. F(Ki,L) - C2K + C 1L
Second period output is consumed by capitalists C2K or labor (Cil) .
Both agents maximize their identical intertemporal utility functions in
first and second period consumption Ci and C2 and the subjective rate of
time preference 2>. s
2) U(C X )+ £*U(C 2 )
3) U'> 0, U"< 0, U' (0) - oo,
given L and K and the investment choices of the other agent.
Given KiL , each choice of KiK will imply a different CiL and that given
o
It has been established that for the kinds of problems we are studying the maximisation problem the planner
faces is identical to the one each a representative consumer faces, thus the solutions reached by the planner or the
single agent are equal (a presentation of this can be found in Milton Harris, 1987). We can restrict the analysis to
the problem the planner faces without loss of generality.
Kik, each choice of Kil will imply a different Cik- Alternative
assumptions about how player 1 imagines player 2 to choose determine the
equilibrium concept of the game. Our particular version of a Nash
equilibrium will assume that player 1 takes player 2's actions as given
and beyond player l's control and player 2 takes a symmetrical view of
player l's actions. Both agents seek to maximize their consumption with
respect to their investment in period 1 conditioned on the other agents
decision which allows the first and second period material balance
equations to serve as budget constraints. Substituting in, we get the
Euler's equation:
4) U'(F(K ,L) - K1K + C 1L - K1L ) -
B*U'(F(KL ,L) - C 1l)*F'k,2
To find the consistent equilibrium we derive the reaction functions
Kik(Kil) , Kil(Kik) for both capitalists and labor. At the Nash solution
each set of agents is behaving optimally given the other's actions.
1. Derivation of the Reaction Functions for Capitalists
.
Since agents receive their marginal product:
5) F(K!,L ) - C 1L - K 1K*F' K ,2
and we can rewrite equation 4 as
6) U'(F(K ,Lo) - K 1K + C 1L - K 1L ) =
U' (Kik*F'k,2)*F'k,2
An additional unit of investment by labor lowers next periods return on
investment F'k,2- This lowers both next period's capitalist's income
(income effect) and return on investment (substitution effect). The
income effect makes capitalists increase investment to equalize the
marginal utility of tomorrow's income with today's while the
substitution effect lowers it by making investment less profitable. We
will assume, as is common in the literature, that the substitution
effect dominates.
2. Derivation of the Reaction Functions for Labor.
Labor's problem differs critically because workers receive income
not only from savings (investment) that it carries from period 1 to 2
,
but also from wages, the marginal revenue product of labor. Therefore
7) F(Ki,L) - C 1K - K 1L*F' Ki2 + Lo*F' L>2
and we can rewrite equation 8 as
8) U'(F(K ,L) - K 1L - C 1K - K 1K ) -
B*U'(Kii*F' K ,2 + L*F' L>2 )*F' K ,2
Investment by the capitalists brings about an increase in F' L ,2 and a
fall in F'k,2, which increases next period's labor's income (income
effect) and lowers their next period return on investment (substitution
effect). Both effects of capital's investment together unequivocally
reduce labor's investment:
9) «(Kil)/6(Kik) < .
This offsetting behaviour by labor is the effect we desire to
contrast to the case of homogenous agents, where investment by one
implies investment by all. It is emphatically not the case that people
are myopic and do not see that their future income is contingent on
their rate of savings now nor is it an externality in the strict sense
of the term. Rational agents, observing increased investment by
capitalist upgrade their estimate of next period's incomes and consume
more now.
B. NASH SOLUTION WITH COBB-DOUGLAS PRODUCTION FUNCTION AND
LOGARITHMIC UTILITY FUNCTION.
Employing Cobb-Douglas Technology and logarithmic utility yeilds
particularly transparent reaction functions and permits simple graphical
analysis. Let
10) F(K,L)- K^ 1""
and
11) U(C)-log(C).
1. Optimal Investment Reaction Function for Capitalists
Equation 4, the Euler equation for the capitalists,
now has the form
12) (l/C 1K)-(l/C2K)*aK 1 a - 1L 1
- a
10
In the first period Capital's consumption is the residual of investment
by both actors and consumption by labor
13) Cik - F(Ko,L) - Kik - Cil - K 1L -
KoaL1-* - Kik - C 1L - Kil
In the second period capitalists consume both the return and the actual
capital.
14) C2K - B*F' K ,2*Ki - KiK^aK!8
' 1^- 3
Equation 16 can now be re -written as
15) (l/f^L 1 "" - K 1K - C 1L - K 1L ]) -
B*(aKia - 1L1 - a )/[KiK*aKi a - 1L1_a ]
which reduces to
16) Kuc-fB/CB+Dl^CKoaL1 -" - C1L - K 1L )
17) <5Kik/6KiL - [B/(B+1)]*(-<5C 1L/<5K 1L - 6K 1L/6K1L )
= [B/(B+1)]*(1-1)
-
Note that 6Cil/6Kil is equal to -1 because every unit labor invests in
period 1 must be matched with an equal reduction in their consumption
that period. <SKik/<$KiL - implies that under the current
11
specifications of the production and utility functions, investment of
capitalists does not depend in the investment pattern of labor. This is
reflected in Graph 4 as the vertical line RK . The decrease in F'
resulting from an increase in investment by labor that might lead to an
increase in consumption in period 1 is exactly offset by the increase in
utility resulting from the fall in income in period 2. Capitalists'
investment is bounded by the interval (0,QK), where QK is capitalists
total income in period 1.
2. Optimal Investment Reaction Function for Labor.
An almost identical derivation yeilds the reaction function for labor:
18) (l/C 1L)-(l/C 2L)*aK 1 a - 1L 1 - a .
Given that
19) C 1L - F(K0( L) - K 1K - C 1K - K 1L - Ko^ 1
' 8
- KiL - C 1K -KiK
20) C2L - KiL*F'k,2 + L*F' L 2 - KiL^aKi 3
- 1^-" + L* (a-l)KiaL- a
equation 22 can be re-written as
21) (l/tKoaL^-KLi-CiK-KKi])-
B*(aKia - 1L 1 - a )/[KiL*aKi a ' 1L1 - a + L*(a-l)KiaL"
which reduces to
22) B^KoaL 1 " 3 - K 1L - C 1K - K 1K ) = K1L + (l/a)*(l-a)*K!
12
Differentiating the above expression:
23) B*(6"Kil - 6K1K + <5KiK ) - SKu. +(l/a)*(l-a)*(«K1L + <5KiK )
Note that 6Cik/<SKik - -1 because every unit capitalists invest in period
1 must be matched with an equal reduction in their consumption that
period. Further simplification gives:
24) 6KiL/6"K 1K - (a-l)/(Ba+l) < 0.
This algebraically confirms our previous intuition that for labor the
combined substitution and income effect are negative, and the resulting
reaction function, depicted as line RL in graph 4, must have a negative
slope. Labors' investment is bounded by the interval (-Qk,Ql)i where Ql
>— KLimax (Ql is labors' total income in period 1). The negative lower
bound reflects the fact that workers receive payment to their labor in
period 2 even if they invest nothing in period 1. This income allows
them to incur in consumption debts (negative investment) with
capitalists and pay with their period 2 wages.
3. Equilibrium
The intersection of RL and RK defines the unique Nash equilibrium.
It is immediately apparent that labor saves( invests) less as capital
saves (invests) more and that there exists a level of investment by
capitalists sufficiently large, at point B, that labors' optimal
13
reaction is to invest zero and beyond this point, to borrow against
future earnings
.
C. EXTENSIONS
1
.
Policies to Increase Investment
Investment increasing policies, be they increasing foreign aid,
liberalization of the financial sector, or tax reforms, that seek to
shift the RK line to the right are bound to be frustrated to the degree
that workers react by reducing their savings or borrowing to consume,
represented by the slope of Rl . This can be shown to be less than 45°
independent of the specific formulation of the production and utility
functions so investment can never be more than "crowded out" though it
could be completely offset. From equation 24 we see that the offset
effect under Cobb Douglas Technology is proportional to (1-a) , the share
of labor in output.
2. Tax and Subsidy Policies
A tax on wages to maintain them at present levels forever would
remove income effect and hence thwart the offset though it would seem at
odds with the overall goal of raising incomes. Returning the taxes with
interest at a later date would work only if agents could not borrow
against these earnings in the capital markets such as appears to be the
case in Singapore9 . A subsidy on investments would shift both the RL and
RK curve to the right, delaying, but never eliminating the offset or the
eventual borrowing against future earnings by workers.
9 Kraus 1987
iGraph 4
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3. Consumption Rationing
In equilibrium to the left of B where labor still saves permits
of no constructive intervention in credit markets. However, to the
right of B where borrowing against future income occurs, a policy of
restricting consumer credit forces consumers off their reaction function
to where they must live within their means each period. This clearly
implies a pareto inferior solution for consumers but is savings, hence
growth, enhancing. While cultural characteristics have been credited
with the extremely high savings rates, particularly in East Asia, the
existence of Sarakin (informal credit markets) in Japan and an active
curb market at very high real rates in Korea suggest that central bank
policies restricting consumer credit were binding and that demand
existed for credit that would have competed for investment resources
critical to the accelerated growth strategies these countries pursued.
4. Liberalizing a Repressed Financial Sector
Liberalizing a repressed financial sector under such circumstances
is clearly not without peril. Far from raising the rate of savings as
is usually assumed, workers will move to their reaction function and
consume more, depressing the overall savings rate. Schmitt-Hebel(1989)
assigns 30% of the increase in consumption demand in 1979-82 Chile
precisely to the increased availability of credit suggesting repressed
demand beforehand. Part of the recent surge in Japanese consumer
spending has been attributed to the spending of savings which in absence
of mortgage finance, were for future housing purchases now made
infeasible by astronomical real estate values. 10 Were mortgage
10 The Economist, September 9, 1989
15
financing abundantly available as in the US, Japan would probably not
have generated saving rates at its previously high level. 11
5. Culture and the Subjective Rate of Time Preference
Our purpose is not to dismiss cultural determinants of savings in
these countries. Varying degrees of societal greediness can be
incorporated in the subjective rate of discount parameter B. A low SRD,
representing perhaps a thrifty traditional society would rotate the RL
curve up decreasing consumption and increasing worker investment for
every level of capitalist investment. Such economies would enjoy a
long period of investment by capitalists before demands for consumer
credit begin to compete for investment funds. Conversely societies
strongly affected by the "demonstration effect" or a high B may find
themselves short on savings early in the development process. The point
is rather that in the process of growth itself resides a natural dynamic
toward the diminution of savings and that some institutional contraints
on free capital markets may be desirable to ensure sufficient investment
resources
.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Once the decision has been made to pursue a high growth strategy
in spite of possible welfare losses to the current generation, the
financial sector becomes an important tool for ensuring a compatible
intertemporal allocation of investment resources. We have shown using
simple analytics that any situation of financial autarky where welfare
can be improved by increased intermediation can easily lead to a decline
11 In 1975, The share of Installment Mortgage + Consumer Credit in GNP in 1975 totaled 16% in 1975 vs. 51% in
the US. In 1975, 5.7 of all Japanese bank loans were consumer loans rising to 8% in 1985.
16
in the level of savings, and hence investment. It is then shown that in
an economy with actors with differing asset endowments, there is a
natural tendency toward lower savings rates that is exacerbated when
expected growth rates are high, or in the presence of demonstration
effects or uncertainty about the permanence of reform programs. While
the offset effect can be somewhat clumsily reduced by tax policies,
direct restrictions on consumer credit seem more effective. Further, if
financial markets are liberalized where there exists sizable pent-up
demand for consumer credit, a predictable loss in investable resources
may result that dominates any increase in efficiency. The standard
arguments in favor of increased intermediation are thus incomplete and
deserving of strong caveat while a theoretical justification emerges for
the heavily regulated financial structures of the East Asian NICS.
17
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